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Abstract. We study the e¤ects of a horizontal merger when rms compete on price and
quality. In a Salop framework with three symmetric rms, several striking results appear.
First, the merging rms reduce quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside rm
increases both price and quality. As a result, the average price in the market increases, but
also the average quality. Second, the outside rm benets more than the merging rms from
the merger, and the merger can be unprotable for the merger partners, i.e., the merger
paradox may appear. Third, the merger always reduces total consumer utility (though some
consumers may benet), but total welfare can increase due to endogenous quality cost savings.
In a generalised framework with n rms, we identify two key factors for the merger e¤ects:
(i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality costs, which determines the nature of strategic
interaction, and (ii) the cross-quality and cross-price demand e¤ects, which determines the
intensity of price relative to quality competition. These ndings have implications for antitrust
policy in industries where quality is a key strategic variable for the rms.
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1 Introduction
In most markets rms compete not only on price (or quantity), but also along several non-
price dimensions, such as quality, variety, marketing, R&D, etc. In such markets horizontal
mergers facilitate not just coordination on price (or quantity), but indeed also on the relevant
non-price variables, implying that the merger e¤ects will depend on the strategic relationship
between price and non-price variables. Despite this obvious fact, within the extensive literature
on mergers surprisingly few papers have explicitly analysed the e¤ects of horizontal mergers
when rms compete along both price and non-price variables.1
In this paper we o¤er a contribution towards lling this gap in the literature by focusing on
quality as the key non-price variable. Product (or service) quality a¤ects consumer choice and
demand, and is therefore an important strategic variable for rms in most industries. For ex-
ample, airline companies decide on service quality and frequency of ights to attract customers;
pharmaceutical companies invest in R&D to improve drug quality; health-care providers ac-
1See, for instance, the extensive survey by Whinston (2007). Although there is a large empirical literature
on horizontal mergers that accounts for product characteristics (see, e.g., Björnerstedt and Verboven, 2016,
and references therein) these are treated as exogenous, and not as an endogenous strategic variable for the
rms, which is a key feature of our model.
1
quire medical technology to o¤er better health services; car dealers expend promotional e¤ort
to increase sales. In such industries, horizontal mergers will a¤ect not just prices but indeed
also product (or service) quality, which jointly determines merger protability and welfare
e¤ects.
The quality dimension has received more attention in recent antitrust practice. For exam-
ple, a feared reduction of service quality was one of the elements determining the European
Commissions decision to reject the proposed takeover of Aer Lingus by Ryanair in 2007.2
Nevertheless, the e¤ects of mergers on quality remain an under-researched issue, which poses
a considerable challenge to competition policy practitioners, as pointed out by the OECD
Competition Committee:
"...the role of quality e¤ects in merger controls, and in particular, trading o¤
between quality and price e¤ects, remains to be one of the most vexatious  and
still unresolved  issues." (OECD, 2013, p. 1)
When analysing the (anti-)competitive e¤ects of a horizontal merger, we ask the following
set of questions: Does the merger result in higher prices and poorer quality, or is there a scope
for lower prices or higher quality? Is the merger protable, and in case for whom? Can a
merger without any direct cost synergies be welfare improving? As our analysis will reveal,
the answers to these questions crucially rely on two factors: (i) the strategic relationship
between rms price and quality decisions; and (ii) the intensity of competition (or demand-
responsiveness) on quality relative to price.
In the rst part of the paper, we apply a Salop (1979) spatial competition framework where
demand is explicitly derived from individual preferences and depends on price, quality and
distance, which implies that products are horizontally and (potentially) vertically di¤eren-
tiated. We consider a pre-merger market structure with three identical rms symmetrically
located on the Salop circle. We assume that two of the three rms merge, which implies that
the merger e¤ects also include the strategic response by the non-merging (outside) rm.3 The
merger facilitates coordination of price and quality decisions by the merging rms. Thus, the
post-merger market structure is a duopoly with two asymmetric rms, i.e., the two merged
rms and the outside rm. There are no direct cost synergies of the merger, but the rms
costs may of course be a¤ected by the merger through endogenous changes in price and quality.
From the Salop framework, we derive three striking results. First, the merging rms reduce
quality but possibly also price, whereas the outside rm increases both price and quality. This
result is surprising at rst glance. If rms compete only on price (with xed quality), a merger
would lead to higher prices both for the merging and outside rms due to prices being strategic
complements. Moreover, if rms compete only on quality (with xed price), the merger would
lead to lower quality at both the merging and non-merging rms due to qualities being strategic
complements.4
2Commission decision of 27 June 2007 in Case No COMP/M.4439  Ryanair / Aer Lingus I.
3A merger that involves all rms in the market is not considered for two reasons. First, mergers that
result in a monopoly are usually prohibited by antitrust authorities, and thus rarely observed in practice.
Second, such mergers ignore the strategic response by the non-merging rms, and the merger e¤ects are
usually straightforward (and equivalent to comparing monopoly to competition).
4As we will show later, quality decisions are strategic complements, for given prices, if rms have variable
quality costs. If quality costs are only xed costs, then quality decisions are strategically independent (when
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However, when rms compete on both price and quality, the nature of strategic interaction
changes, and the merger e¤ects are qualitatively di¤erent. Whereas the merging rms always
reduce quality, the non-merging rm responds by increasing quality.5 The reason is that the
outside rm also responds to the merger by increasing prices, and a higher prot margin makes
it protable to increase quality, thus making qualities net strategic substitutes among rms.6
In fact, the quality response by the outside rm is su¢ciently strong to ensure an increase in
average quality (weighted by demand) in the market as a result of the merger.
Moreover, the non-merging rm always responds to the merger by increasing prices, whereas
the merging rms increase prices only if demand responsiveness to quality is su¢ciently low.
The possibility that prices of merging rms may decrease is at rst glance surprising and
results from the fact that price and quality are within-rm strategic complements. A merger
allows the merging parties to internalise a negative competition externality by reducing quality
and increasing price. However, lower quality reduces demand, which implies that prots are
maximised at a lower price. This latter e¤ect is the dominant one, implying that the overall
e¤ect of the merger is a price reduction by the merging rms, if the demand responsiveness to
quality is su¢ciently strong. Nevertheless, the average price in the market always increases
as a result of the merger.
Second, the non-merging rm always benets more from the merger than the merging
rms. Thus, the well-known merger paradox is present also in our framework with quality
competition. Furthermore, a merger is privately protable unless demand responsiveness to
quality is su¢ciently high. If demand is very quality-elastic, a merger triggers a quality
increase by the non-merging rm that is su¢ciently strong to make the merger unprotable.
This is an interesting result considering that prices are strategic complements, which tends to
make mergers protable under Bertrand competition (with di¤erentiated products).7
Third, because of the non-uniform e¤ects of a merger on quality and price, the welfare
e¤ects are generally ambiguous. We show that consumer utility is reduced on average, although
some consumers may actually be better o¤: if demand is su¢ciently quality-elastic, the utility
gain of the quality increase outweighs the utility loss of the price increase for consumers who
buy from the non-merging rm. Perhaps surprisingly, we also nd that a merger might in
fact improve social welfare if demand is su¢ciently responsive to quality. The reason is that
a merger indirectly leads to savings of (endogenous) xed quality costs.
In the second part of the paper, we generalise the analysis by considering an imperfect
competition framework with n rms and fairly general demand and cost functions. While the
merger e¤ects are, as expected, more ambiguous, we are able to pin down two key factors
that determine the e¤ects on price and quality: (i) the magnitude of marginal variable quality
costs, which determines the nature of strategic interaction along the quality and price dimen-
prices are xed). For more details, see, for instance, Brekke et al. (forthcoming) who analyse the e¤ects
hospital mergers with regulated prices.
5This asymmetric quality e¤ect of a merger is partly mirrored in the results from the simulated e¤ects of
a merger in the Minneapolis newspaper market in Fan (2013), where she nds a drop in content quality for
the merged newspapers but a quality increase for two out of three competitors.
6The concept of net strategic substitutability/complementarity is explained in Section 3.
7See the seminal work by Denecker and Davidson (1985). Assuming Cournot competition, Salant et
al. (1983) reported the striking result that mergers are usually not protable for the merging rms unless
su¢ciently many rms take part in the merger. See also Perry and Porter (1985) and Farrell and Shapiro
(1990).
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sions, and (ii) the relative magnitude of cross-quality and cross-price e¤ects on demand, which
determines the relative intensity of competition along the quality and price dimensions. More
precisely, we dene the intensity of competition to be stronger along the quality dimension than
along the price dimension if cross-quality e¤ects (on demand) are larger (in absolute value)
than cross-price e¤ects, and vice versa. Using this conceptual denition, we show that if rms
compete su¢ciently strongly on quality relative to price, the merged rm will increase both
price and quality, and, vice versa, if competition is su¢ciently much stronger on prices than
on qualities, the merged rm will reduce both price and quality. However, for intermediate
cases, the merged rms quality and price responses are generally ambiguous.
The response from non-merging rms depends on the nature of strategic interaction. If
variable quality costs are su¢ciently small, qualities are net strategic substitutes and prices
are net strategic complements. In this case, we show that the non-merging rms quality and
price responses always go in the same direction. If the merged rms incentives to reduce
quality are su¢ciently strong, the non-merging rms will respond by increasing both quality
and price, which is the case in the Salop framework. On the other hand, if the merged rm
has su¢ciently strong incentives to increase prices, the non-merging rms will respond by
reducing both quality and price. The former case arises if competition is su¢ciently strong
along the quality dimension, whereas the latter case requires that competition is su¢ciently
strong along the price dimension.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 we relate our paper to the existing
literature. In Section 3 and 4 we set up a three rm Salop model and derive the e¤ects of a
horizontal merger on the market outcomes and welfare. The merger e¤ects on price and quality
are generalised in Section 4, where we present a general di¤erentiated-products framework with
n rms. In Section 5 we summarise our ndings and provide some concluding remarks. All
proofs of the propositions in Sections 3 and 4 are provided in Appendix A and B, respectively.
2 Related literature
The economic literature on horizontal mergers is large, starting with the seminal contributions
by Salant et al. (1983), Perry and Porter (1985), and Farrell and Shapiro (1990) for horizontal
mergers in a Cournot oligopoly. A key result from these studies is the merger paradox,
i.e., that horizontal mergers tend to be unprotable for the merging rms but protable for
the non-merging rms.8 The reason is that the non-merging rms respond by increasing
production and thus capturing a larger share of the market, making the quantity reduction by
the merging rms unprotable, though the market price increases. Our study is more related
to the seminal paper by Deneckere and Davidson (1985) who nd in a Bertrand oligopoly
with di¤erentiated products that horizontal mergers tend to be protable for all rms in the
industry; a result that is due to the fact that prices are strategic complements. We show in
our paper that the merger paradox may re-appear in a model where rms sell di¤erentiated
products and compete in prices and quality. The main reason for this is that the non-merging
rms respond to the merger by increasing quality and capturing a larger share of the market,
8Salant et al. (1983) show that if su¢ciently many of the rms in the industry take part in the merger,
then the merger become protable. Farrell and Shapiro (1990) consider also e¢ciency gains, which of course
increases the scope for protable mergers, and also welfare improving mergers.
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i.e., qualities are (net) strategic substitutes.9
Although the literature on horizontal mergers is generally large, surprisingly few papers
explicitly study merger e¤ects when competition is multidimensional, including price and
non-price variables. A recent and rare exception is Pinto and Sibley (2016) who analyse
unilateral merger e¤ects using a di¤erentiated Bertrand model with endogenous quality. Based
on numerical simulations with ve rms, they nd that the merged rms quality might increase
or decrease as a result of a merger. Our paper di¤ers in that we are able to derive analytical
results on price and quality e¤ects of a horizontal merger using a Salop framework, which also
enables us to conduct a full welfare analysis of the merger e¤ects. Our paper also di¤ers in that
we propose a generalised model with n rms, non-linear demand and non-parameterised cost
structure, which allows us to identify key mechanisms that determine the nature of competition
and thus merger e¤ects in markets where rms compete on price and quality.
There exists, though, a rich literature on competition and quality, dating back at least
to Swan (1970), who compared the incentives of a monopolist and a competitive rm with
respect to a particular quality dimension, namely product durability. Much of the subsequent
literature consists of papers that apply a vertical di¤erentiation framework, often with rms
that o¤er a range of products with di¤erent qualities.10 Models of price-quality competition
in a horizontal di¤erentiation framework are fewer and include, i.e., Economides (1993), Ma
and Burgess (1993), Gravelle (1999) and Brekke et al. (2010).11 However, there is no explicit
merger analysis in these papers.
In fact, theoretical studies that explicitly analyse the e¤ects of a horizontal merger on the
price and quality o¤ered by merging and non-merging rms are almost non-existent. A notable
exception is Gabszewicz et al. (2015), who analyse a game of endogenous coalition formation in
a three-rm version of Mussa and Rosens (1978) model of vertical di¤erentiation. Because of
the intrinsic asymmetry of the chosen modelling framework, the focus of this paper is mainly on
identifying equilibrium coalition structures and it is therefore quite di¤erent from the present
paper. Willig (2011) includes product quality in an analysis of unilateral competitive e¤ects
of horizontal mergers (upward pricing pressure), but there is no equilibrium analysis with
strategic interaction between merging and non-merging rms. Tenn et al. (2010), which is
mainly an empirical study, construct a theoretical model where rms compete in price and
promotion, and show that the e¤ects of the merger on prices are very di¤erent in the presence
of promotional competition. However, there is no strategic interaction between merging and
non-merging rms, since the merger is equivalent to monopolising the industry, i.e., the merger
changes the market structure from duopoly to monopoly.12
9This is always the case in the linear Salop model, but also the case in the more general model for su¢ciently
small marginal variable quality costs.
10Some early key contributions to this strand of the literature include Gabszewicz and Thisse (1979, 1980)
and Shaked and Sutton (1982, 1983) for the case of single-product rms, and Mussa and Rosen (1979), Gal-Or
(1983) and Champsaur and Rochet (1989) for the case of multi-product rms.
11There are also a few empirical papers studying the e¤ect of more competition on quality; for example
Mazzeo (2003), who nds a positive relationship between competition and quality in the US airline industry;
and Matsa (2011) who studies the e¤ect of competition on supermarkets incentive to provide quality, and
nds that competition from Wal-Mart decreases inventory shortfalls by up to 24 percent.
12In a related paper, Brekke et al. (forthcoming) study hospital mergers, allowing for quality competition
and strategic interaction between merging and non-merging rms. However, prices are regulated and hospitals
are assumed to be semi-altruistic rms. Two other papers on hospital mergers by Calem et al. (2003) and
5
Despite the obvious importance of the topic, the empirical literature on the e¤ects of hori-
zontal mergers on quality is also relatively scarce.13 However, there are a few exceptions. Fan
(2013) develops a structural model of newspaper markets and show that ignoring adjustments
to product characteristics as a result of a merger substantially a¤ects the simulated merger ef-
fects. Focusing on a merger in the Minneapolis newspaper market that was blocked by the US
Department of Justice, she nds that the merger would have led to higher prices, but a reduc-
tion in content quality, local news ratio and content variety. Similar conclusions are reached
by Tenn et al. (2010) based on merger simulation in the ice cream industry, where they report
that a blocked merger would have led to higher prices and lower promotional e¤ort.14 Israel et
al. (2013) conduct a merger simulation in the US airline industry, and nd that prices (fares)
would increase but also quality, resulting in a reduction in quality-adjusted prices due to the
merger. There are also some empirical studies on (actual) mergers in the hospital industry,
which tend to nd large price e¤ects and weak (though mostly negative) e¤ects on quality
(see Gaynor and Town, 2012).15 Thus, there is great ambiguity in the empirical ndings on
horizontal mergers, which reects the ndings of our theoretical analysis.
Our paper is also somewhat related to the literature on horizontal mergers and product
choice, which acknowledges that a merger might lead the merging (and possibly non-merging)
rms to reposition their products or to change their product line. Theoretical contributions
in this strand of the literature include Lommerud and Sørgard (1997), Posada and Straume
(2004), Norman et al. (2005) and Gandhi et al. (2008), whereas key empirical contributions
include Berry and Waldfogel (2001) and Sweeting (2010). Although in our formal analysis we
do not allow, by assumption, for the possibility that a merger might a¤ect product choices,
we will return to a further discussion of this possibility in the nal section of the paper.
3 A Salop model
In this section, we set up a simple Salop model where rms compete on price and quality. Con-
sider a market for a particular good where three rms, denoted by i = 1; 2; 3, are equidistantly
located on a circle with circumference equal to 1.16 A total mass of 1 consumers are uniformly
distributed on the same circle. The spatial dimension reects either horizontal product dif-
ferentiation or geographical distance. Each consumer demands one unit of the good from the
most preferred provider. The net utility of a consumer located at z and buying the good from
Brekke (2004) allow for both price and quality competition, but consider only mergers that lead to monopoly.
13The empirical literature on horizontal mergers in general, though, is extensive; see, for instance, the review
by Whinston (2007).
14They also show that ignoring promotional e¤ort implies that one underestimates the price e¤ects of the
merger.
15See also Ho and Hamilton (2000), Capps (2005) and Romano and Balan (2011).
16The assumption of three instead of n rms is made in order to make the analysis tractable. In a market
with n rms there would be ex post di¤erences among the non-merging rms, where the incentives for a
non-merging rm with respect to quality and price setting in the post-merger game depend on its relative
positioning in space vis-à-vis the merged rms. However, as competition is localised, the strongest responses
to a merger will always come from the merging rms closest neighbours. Therefore, the assumption of three
rms is without too much loss of generality.
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Firm i, located at xi, is given by
uz;xi = v + bqi   pi   t (z   xi)
2 ; (1)
where qi and pi are the quality o¤ered and the price charged, respectively, by Firm i; b > 0 is
the marginal utility of quality; and t > 0 is a transportation cost parameter.
The demand facing each rm is a function of its own price and quality, and the prices and
qualities of its two competitors. When each consumer makes a utility-maximising choice, the







[b (2qi   qi+1   qi 1)  (2pi   pi+1   pi 1)] : (2)
Notice that a high (low) value of b relative to t implies a high (low) demand responsiveness to
quality.
All rms are assumed to have ex ante identical costs. Firm is cost function is given by




where c 2 (0; b) and k > 0. This cost function allows for both variable and xed costs
of quality, and implies that quality and output are cost substitutes.17 In order to ensure
equilibrium existence with interior solutions in both the pre- and post-merger game, we impose
the parameter restrictions c < b and t > 9 (b  c)2 =5k. Each rm is assumed to maximise
prots, given by




3.1 The pre-merger game
We look for the Nash equilibrium of a game where price and quality choices are made simul-
taneously.18 Firm i chooses qi and pi to maximise (4). The rst-order conditions for optimal




3 (b+ c) pi   (6bc+ kt) qi
t
+






17For example, higher quality implies higher variable production costs if more expensive inputs are required
to produce a higher-quality product.
18The results are qualitatively similar if we instead assume that quality and price decisions are made
sequentially. The derivation of these results are available upon request.












































3 (b+ c) qi   6pi
t
+
3j 6=i (pj   bqj)
2t
= 0: (6)
In order to understand the merger e¤ects, it is instructive to analyse the strategic interac-
tion between the quality and price decisions, both within each rm and between rms. From
(5) the best-quality-response function of Firm i is given by
qi (pi; pj; qj) =
3 (b+ c) pi
(6bc+ kt)
+






whereas the best-price-response function is given by










We see that both qualities and prices are gross strategic complements between competing
rms; i.e., @qi=@qj > 0 for given prices and @pi=@pj > 0 for given qualities.
The (gross) strategic complementarity between qualities is explained as follows. If a rm
increases its quality, the competing rms lose demand, which in turn reduces their marginal
cost of quality provision. These rms will therefore respond by increasing their quality. Notice
that this strategic complementarity is caused by the presence of variable quality costs. In
contrast, if there are only xed costs of quality provision (i.e., if c = 0), the rms optimal
quality choices are strategically independent.
The strategic complementarity of the rms pricing decisions is standard. All else equal,
a unilateral price increase by one rm leads to higher demand for the competing rms. Their
marginal revenues (measured as a function of output) are consequently reduced and they will
optimally respond by increasing their prices as well.
However, the strategic relationships described above are partial in the sense that one of
the choice variables (price or quality) is taken to be xed. How do quality and price decisions
interact strategically? From (7) and (8) we see that quality and price are strategic complements
within rms; i.e., @qi=@pi > 0 and @pi=@qi > 0. A higher price has two e¤ects on the incentives
for quality provision. It increases the rms prot margin and also reduces the marginal cost
of quality provision through lower demand. Both e¤ects contribute to a higher optimal level
of quality. And vice versa, a higher quality level leads to higher demand and also increases
marginal production costs, and both e¤ects contribute to a higher optimal price.
On the other hand, quality and price are strategic substitutes between rms; i.e., @qi=@pj < 0
and @pi=@qj < 0. All else equal, a unilateral price increase by one rm leads to higher demand
for competing rms. As a result, their marginal costs of quality provision increase and they
will optimally respond by reducing their qualities. Similarly, if a rm increases its quality,
competing rms will have lower demand and their prots are therefore maximised, all else
equal, at a lower price.
We can internalise the strategic relationship between quality and price within each rm by
simultaneously solving (7)-(8) with respect to qi and pi, yielding
pi (pj; qj) =
(kt+ 3c (b  c)) (2t+ 9j 6=i (pj   bqj))
18
 




qi (pj; qj) =
(b  c) (2t+ 9j 6=i (pj   bqj))
6
 
2kt  3 (b  c)2
 : (10)
Whereas the strategic complementarity between prices remains, we see that the strategic rela-
tionship between qualities changes when we take the optimal price adjustments into account.
In other words, qualities are net strategic substitutes; i.e., @qi=@qj < 0 when pi is optimally
adjusted.20 As explained above, the direct (gross) e¤ect of higher quality by a rm is that
rival rms will increase their qualities and lower their prices. However, as quality and price
are strategic complements within rms, a lower price implies that the quality should be opti-
mally adjusted downwards. This indirect e¤ect outweighs the direct e¤ect, making qualities
net strategic substitutes.21
The various strategic relationships between the rms price and quality decisions can be
summarised as follows:
Lemma 1 In a Salop model where rms compete on price and quality,
(i) prices are gross strategic complements (@pi (qi) =@pj > 0);
(ii) qualities are gross strategic complements (@qi (pi) =@qj > 0);
(iii) prices are net strategic complements (@pi=@pj > 0);
(iv) qualities are net strategic substitutes (@qi=@qj < 0);
(v) quality and price are strategic complements within rms (@pi=@qi > 0 and @qi=@pi > 0);
(vi) quality and price are strategic substitutes across rms (@pi (qi) =@qj < 0 and @qi (pi) =@pj <
0).
Simultaneously solving the three pairs of best-response functions given by (9)-(10), the













3.2 The post-merger game
Consider a merger between two of the rms. We assume that the merger does not change
the type and number of products in the market. In other words, a merger only implies a
coordination of price and quality decisions by the merger participants.23 In the post-merger
game, the outside rm chooses quality and price, denoted qo and po, to maximise its prots,
whereas the merger participants choose quality and price for each of the merged rms products
20Notice that this relationship holds also without cost substitutability (c = 0).
21In a similar type of spatial competition model, Barros and Martinez-Giralt (2002) also nd that qual-
ities are strategic substitutes under price-quality competition. In a three-rm vertical di¤erentiation model
with quality-then-price competition, Scarpa (1998) nds that quality competition is characterised by strategic
complementarity between some rms and strategic substitutability between others.
22Expressions for equilibrium prots in the pre- and post-merger games are presented in Appendix A.
23We return to a further discussion of this assumption in the concluding section of the paper.
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(or at each of the merged rms plants), denoted qm and pm, to maximise the sum of the two












5kt  9 (b  c)2

(2kt+ 3c (b  c))
27k
 
2kt  3 (b  c)2
 ; (14)








2kt  3 (b  c)2
 ; (15)
po =
(kt+ 3c (b  c))
 




2kt  3 (b  c)2
 ; (16)
for the outside rm. Before analysing the e¤ects of a merger on qualities and prices, let us
rst check under which conditions a merger is protable.
Proposition 1 In a Salop model where rms compete on price and quality, a horizontal






This result is perhaps surprising. It is easily shown that a merger is always protable
when quality is the only competition variable or when price is the only competition variable
(which is a standard result from the merger literature, the seminal paper being Deneckere
and Davidson, 1985). However, a merger might not be protable when competition occurs
simultaneously along both dimensions. The intuition for this result will be discussed below,
after deriving the equilibrium price and quality responses to the merger. For the remainder
of the analysis in this section, we will assume that the condition in Proposition 1 is satised;
i.e., we restrict attention to protable mergers only. This condition, along with the condition
b > c, also ensures existence and uniqueness of the Nash equilibria in the pre- and post-merger
games.
Proposition 2 In a Salop model where rms compete on price and quality, a horizontal
merger leads to
(i) lower quality o¤ered by the merged rms, higher quality o¤ered by the outside rm, and
higher average quality in the market;
(ii) higher (lower) prices charged by the merged rms if the demand responsiveness to
quality is su¢ciently low (high), a higher price charged by the outside rm, and a higher
average price in the market;
(iii) smaller market shares for the merged rms.
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In order to sort out the intuition behind these results, we need to keep in mind the strategic
relationships between qualities and prices  within and across rms  which we previously
analysed in detail. When two rms merge they have an incentive to internalise the negative
competition externality that existed between them in the pre-merger game. All else equal,
they can increase their joint prots by increasing the price and reducing the quality provided.
However, since price and quality are strategic complements within rms, a price increase will
instigate a quality increase, whereas a quality reduction will instigate a price reduction, thus
making the overall price and quality responses of the merging rms a priori ambiguous. On
top of this, the price and quality adjustments by the merging rms will trigger a response
from the outside rm, which in turn induces feedback e¤ects on the merging rms optimal
quality and price decisions.
Proposition 2 shows that the merged rms incentives to reduce competition along the
quality dimension always dominates in the sense that a merger always leads to lower quality
provision by the merging rms. The outside rm will always respond by increasing quality,
which is (mainly) explained by the net strategic substitutability of qualities, as previously
described. Furthermore, the increase in quality and market share for the non-merging rm
implies that the (volume-weighted) average quality in the market goes up as a result of the
merger. In other words, the average consumer enjoys a higher quality in this market as a
result of the merger.
On the other hand, the price response of the merging rms is ambiguous, and a merger
might actually lead to lower prices if the demand responsiveness to quality is su¢ciently high.
If demand responds strongly to quality, competition among rms occur mainly along this
dimension and a merger will therefore lead to a relatively large reduction in quality. It might
then be the case that the within-rm strategic complementarity e¤ect dominates, in the sense
that the quality reduction also leads to lower prices for the merging rms. The outside rm
always responds by increasing the price, though. Even if a merger leads to higher prices for
the merged rms, in which case the net strategic substitutability of prices would indicate
a price reduction for the outside rm, two other e¤ects contribute to a price increase: (i)
higher quality by the outside rm leads also to higher price because of within-rm strategic
complementarity between price and quality, and (ii) lower quality by the merged rm leads to
higher price by the outside rm because quality and price are strategic substitutes between
rms. Regardless of the sign of the price e¤ect for the merged rms, the increase in price and
market share for the non-merging rm also implies that the merger leads to an increase in the
(volume-weighted) average market price.
The intricate strategic relationships between the optimal price and quality decisions also
explain the protability result in Proposition 1. The possibility of unprotable mergers arises
from the fact that qualities are net strategic substitutes. If demand responds su¢ciently
strongly to quality changes, the positive quality response by the outside rm is su¢ciently
strong to make the merger unprotable for the participants.24 It is also easily conrmed that





3 (b  c) b
2

2kt  3 (b  c)
2
 :
The magnitude (in absolute value) of this e¤ect is increasing in b.
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in the merger.
Finally, notice that none of the results in Proposition 2 depend on the presence (or not) of
variable quality costs. Thus, these results hold also for the special case of c = 0.
3.3 Welfare
In order to derive an expression for total consumer utility, notice that Firm is demand func-
tion, given by (2), can alternatively be expressed as






3 (b (qi   qi+1)  (pi   pi+1))
2t
(18)
is the location (measured clockwise from Firm i) of the consumer who is indi¤erent between
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(19)
is the location (measured anticlockwise from rm i) of the consumer who is indi¤erent between
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: (20)
Social welfare also includes prots and is given by





























The detailed expressions for total consumer utility and welfare in the pre- and post-merger
equilibria are given in Appendix A (Section A.2). Based on these expressions, we derive the
following welfare implications of a merger:
Proposition 3 In a Salop model where rms compete on price and quality, a horizontal
merger leads to
(i) lower total consumer utility;
(ii) higher utility for more than a third of all consumers in the market if the demand
responsiveness to quality is su¢ciently high;
25Notice that, if i = 1, then i  1 = 3, and if i = 3, then i+ 1 = 1.
12
(iii) higher social welfare if the demand responsiveness to quality is su¢ciently high; oth-
erwise, welfare drops.
If we consider total consumer utility, or the utility of the average consumer in the market,
a merger has three di¤erent e¤ects: (i) the average quality goes up, which is positive; (ii) the
average price also goes up, which is negative; and (iii) total transportation costs go up (because
of the asymmetry of the post-merger equilibrium), which is also negative. In our model, the
second and third e¤ects always outweigh the rst e¤ect, implying that a merger has a negative
e¤ect on total consumer utility. However, the consumers buying from the non-merging rm
might still benet from the merger. If the demand responsiveness to quality is su¢ciently
high, the quality response of the outside rm is su¢ciently strong to make these consumers
enjoy a net benet from the merger in spite of the corresponding price increase. As these net
benets also apply (due to continuity) to some of the consumers who switch rms as a result
of the merger, more than a third of the consumers in the market might potentially benet
from the merger.
Perhaps the most surprising result of our analysis is that a purely anti-competitive merger
(i.e., a merger with no direct cost synergies) might improve social welfare. This will be
the case if demand responds su¢ciently strongly to quality changes. The intuition behind
this apparently counterintuitive result is the following. Social welfare depends on a trade-o¤
between consumer benets of quality and two types of costs: (i) transportation costs and (ii)
the cost of quality provision. Crucially, the latter type of cost is not minimised with symmetric
supply of quality across all rms in the market. The reason is that there are xed quality
costs (given by the term (k=2)q2i in the cost function), which implies that quality provision
is a quasi-public good at each rm (and a pure public good if c = 0): quality is non-rival in
consumption since consumers benet from quality is not a¤ected by consumption of other
consumers. This makes a merger an instrument for realising endogenous xed-cost synergies.
To see why, consider the case of symmetric quality provision as a starting point. Suppose
then that quality is reduced for some rms and increased for others in such a way that the
total costs of quality provision are no higher than before. Suppose also that consumers switch
from low-quality to high-quality rms to such an extent that average quality provision is at
least as high as before. A more asymmetric market outcome will then clearly lead to a more
cost-e¢cient quality provision. This example serves as a general illustration of the mechanisms
at play. In our specic model, where quality decreases (increases) for the merged (outside)
rm and average quality goes up, it can be shown that the xed cost per unit of average
quality is identical in the pre- and post-merger equilibria. Since average quality is higher
in the post-merger equilibrium, this implies that a merger shifts down the (upward sloping)
average xed cost curve, leading to more cost-e¢cient quality provision.26 In other words, a
merger shifts the equilibrium outcome in the direction of the outcome that minimises quality
provision costs, where only one rm is active in the market.27


















27Because of xed cost duplication, the total cost of providing an average quality q is clearly minimised if
only one rm serves the entire market and provides this quality level.
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However, the cost savings from a more asymmetric quality provision must be weighed
against the increase in total transportation costs that would occur in a more asymmetric
outcome. If transportation costs are su¢ciently low and the marginal utility of quality is
su¢ciently high, social welfare can be increased with a more asymmetric quality provision.28
In our setting, the e¤ect of a merger is precisely to make quality provision more asymmetric.
Quality increases at the non-merging rm and more consumers buy from this rm in the post-
merger equilibrium. Such a merger can therefore increase social welfare because of increased
allocation e¢ciency with respect to xed quality costs, if the demand responsiveness to quality
is su¢ciently high (i.e., if b is su¢ciently high relative to t). We emphasise this result with
the following corollary.
Corollary 1 A merger with no direct synergy might improve social welfare due to a more
cost-e¢cient quality provision and despite an increase in transportation costs.
In Appendix A (section A.3) we o¤er a more detailed and elaborated explanation of the
welfare properties of symmetric versus asymmetric market outcomes in spatial competition
models. Here we show that a merger can only improve welfare when the welfare maximum is
a corner solution, implying that welfare is maximised with only one active rm in the market.
4 A generalised model
In this section we apply a more general imperfect competition model with n rms and fairly
general demand and cost functions. The main purpose is to provide more insight into the
general mechanisms of horizontal mergers in markets with price and quality competition, and
to check the robustness of the results derived within the Salop framework.
Consider a market with n single-product rms, each producing a di¤erentiated product.












Q 0 and @
2Di
@p2i
Q 0. We assume that the demand system is symmetric and that demand
for each good is separable in all qualities and prices.29
The more specic cost function in (3) is generalised as follows:








> 0 and @
2K
@q2i
> 0. Thus, we retain the assumption of constant
marginal production costs for a given quality level. With the above demand and cost functions,
the prot of Firm i is given by
i (qi; pi) = [pi   c (qi)]Di  K (qi) : (24)
28Notice that the cost savings from a more asymmetric quality provision would increase the socially optimal
level of quality. More asymmetric quality provision could therefore increase social welfare if consumers value
the higher average quality level to a su¢cient degree.
29The separability assumption implies that all the second-order partial cross-derivatives of Di are zero,
whereas the symmetry assumption implies that
@Di@qj
 = @Dj@qi for qi = qj and
@Di@pj
 = @Dj@pi for pj = pi.
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4.1 Strategic relationship between qualities and prices
The analysis in Section 3 revealed that the merger e¤ects depend crucially on the nature of
the strategic relationship between the rms choice variables. In the generalised framework,
we can characterise these strategic relationships by considering the case of n = 2, in which
the denition of strategic substitutability/complementarity is straightforward. The symmetric
Nash equilibrium is then implicitly characterised by the following pair of rst-order conditions:
@i
@qi
















i = 1; 2. From this system of equations we can derive two di¤erent sets of best-response
functions: (i) qi (pi; qj; pj) and pi (qi; qj; pj), which determine whether qualities (prices) are
gross strategic substitutes or complements, and (ii) qi (qj; pj) and pi (qj; pj), which determine
whether qualities (prices) are net strategic substitutes or complements.

































Thus, prices are always gross strategic complements, whereas qualities are gross strategic com-
plements as long as there is a positive relationship between quality and marginal production
costs. Thus, the results on gross strategic complementarity derived in Section 3 also hold in
the generalised framework. This should come as no great surprise, given the intuition be-
hind these results, as explained in Section 3. The same is true for the within-rm strategic


















By internalising the above price-quality relationship, we can derive the conditions for qual-
ities (prices) to be net strategic substitutes or complements. By di¤erentiating (25)-(26) with






















































Thus, whether qualities (prices) are net strategic substitutes or complements depends on the
relative strength of two opposing forces.
Regarding qualities, they are, on the one hand, gross strategic complements, as indicated
by the second term in equation (30). On the other hand, if competing Firm j increases quality,
then Firm i will have lower demand and its prots are therefore maximised, all else equal, at
a lower price. Since price and quality are within-rm strategic complements, the quality level
will also be adjusted downwards (rst term in (30)). If latter e¤ect dominates the former,
qualities are net strategic substitutes.
Similarly, regarding prices, they are gross strategic complements, as indicated by the rst
term in (31). However, a price increase by competing Firm j leads to higher demand for
Firm i. As a result, Firm is marginal costs of quality provision will increase and it will
optimally respond by reducing its quality. Since price and quality are within-rm strategic
complements, the price level will also be adjusted downwards (second term in (31)). If the
former e¤ect dominates the latter, prices are net strategic complements.
Notice that the relative strength of the direct and indirect e¤ects depends on the size
of marginal variable quality costs (@c=@qi). If these costs are su¢ciently small, prices are
net strategic complements and qualities are net strategic substitutes, as in the Salop model
analysed in Section 3. However, in the generalised framework, these results can potentially be
reversed if marginal variable quality costs are su¢ciently large.31
The above analysis can be summarised as follows:
Lemma 2 If marginal variable quality costs are su¢ciently small, qualities are net strategic
substitutes whereas prices are net strategic complements.
4.2 Quality and price e¤ects of a merger
Consider now a merger between two of the n rms in the industry. In a di¤erentiated products
model, given that the merger does not a¤ect the number of goods produced, the post-merger
game is an asymmetric game between one multi-product rm (the merged rm) and n   2
single-product rms. Thus, a merger is a discrete change of market structure that, in a general
(non-parameterised) model, makes it hard to use standard comparative statics tools to assess
the e¤ects of the merger. One way to overcome this problem is to consider a marginal
merger. Suppose that the objective functions of the merger candidates (denoted i and j) are
i := i+j and j := j +i, respectively, where  2 (0; 1).
32 The pre- and post-merger
games appear then as the special cases of  = 0 and  = 1, respectively.
Let N = f1; ::; ng be the set of pre-merger rms/products in the industry, letM = fi; jg be
the set of merger participants, and let O = NnM be the set of outside (non-merging) rms.
31In the Salop model, this possibility is ruled out by the condition b > c, which is necessary to ensure
equilibrium existence.
32This approach is somewhat similar to the concept of an innitesmal merger proposed by Farrell and
Shapiro (1990), where such a merger is dened as a small change in the output of the merger participants (the
insiders).
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For the merging Firm i, which merges with Firm j, the rst-order conditions for optimal
quality and price are given by
@i
@qi















= Di + (pi   c(qi))
@Di
@pi






























For the non-merging Firm k, the rst-order conditions are
@k
@qk












= Dk + (pk   c(qk))
@Dk
@pk
= 0; k 2 O: (37)
The Nash equilibrium is thus implicitly given by a system of four equations, (34)-(37), where
all demand functions and their rst-order derivatives are evaluated at the quality-price vector
(qi; qi; qk; :::; qk; pi; pi; pk; :::pk) :
By di¤erentiating the system (34)-(37) with respect to (qi; pi; qk; pk) and , and applying
Cramers Rule, we can derive the equilibrium e¤ects of the merger on the qualities and prices
of all rms in the industry.
4.2.1 Quality and price responses of the merging rms
In qualitative terms, the e¤ects of a merger on the merging rms equilibrium choices of quality




























































































33See Appendix B for full details of the derivations of all expressions in this section.
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Notice, by comparing (40)-(41) with (30)-(31), that 
p > (<) 0 if prices are net strategic
substitutes (complements), whereas 
q > (<) 0 if qualities are net strategic substitutes (com-
plements).
For both the quality response and the price response, we can classify the various sub-e¤ects
into two categories: (i) rst-order e¤ects through the merged rms quality and price setting,
and (ii) second-order (feedback) e¤ects through the strategic responses of non-merging rms.
The two sets of e¤ects are grouped together in the two terms on the right-hand side of (38) and
(39), respectively, where, in both equations, the rst (second) term represents the rst-order
(second-order) e¤ects.
The two rst-order e¤ects that we described in Section 3 are given by the two terms in
the square brackets of (38) and (39), respectively. The internalisation-of-competition e¤ect,
which implies lower quality (in (38)) and higher prices (in (39)), is captured by the rst term,
whereas the within-rm strategic complementarity e¤ect, which implies higher quality (in (38))
and lower prices (in (39)), is captured by the second term.
These rst-order e¤ects of a merger are complemented by feedback e¤ects through the
non-merged rms price and quality responses. These e¤ects are given by the second term in
(38) and (39), respectively, with an a priori indeterminate sign. Whether the feedback e¤ects
counteract or reinforce the rst-order e¤ects depends on the relative strength of quality and
price competition, and on the strategic nature of competition along these two dimensions.
The next proposition identies two cases in which rst-order and second-order e¤ects go
in the same direction and produce unambiguous results. These two cases are identied by the
relative size of cross-quality e¤ects (i.e., j@Dj=@qij) and cross-price e¤ects (i.e., @Dj=@pi) on
demand.
To characterise the e¤ect of a merger, we assume that the equilibrium outcomes (prices
and qualities) are monotonic in , so that the sign of a marginal merger has qualitatively
the same sign of a merger with  going from 0 (no merger) to 1 (merger). The assumption
of monotonicity is plausible since the sign of the partial derivatives of equilibrium prices and
qualities with respect to  does not depend directly on the value of  but only indirectly
through the e¤ect of  on prices and qualities.
Proposition 4 Suppose that marginal variable quality costs are su¢ciently low, such that

p < 0 and 
q > 0. We can then identify two di¤erent cases in which the quality and price
responses of the merged rm are unambiguous:
(i) If the cross-quality e¤ect is su¢ciently small relative to the cross-price e¤ect, a merger
leads to higher prices and higher quality by the merged rm.
(ii) If the cross-price e¤ect is su¢ciently small relative to the cross-quality, a merger leads
to lower prices and lower quality by the merged rm.
34The positive sign of  follows from the assumption of a negative denite Jacobian matrix.
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The rst case identied in Proposition 4 denes a situation in which rms compete much
harder on price than on quality. In this case, the internalisation-of-competition e¤ect is much
stronger for price than for quality, which in turn means that the within-rm strategic comple-
mentarity e¤ect is much stronger for the quality decision than for the price decision. Thus,
in sum, this gives the merged rm an incentive to increase both price and quality, and these
(rst-order) e¤ects are reinforced by the second-order e¤ects, as long as prices are net strategic
complements (
p < 0) and qualities are net strategic substitutes (
q > 0).
The second case identies the reverse scenario, where rms compete much more ercely on
quality than on price. In this case, the results are driven by the internalisation-of-competition
e¤ect being su¢ciently much stronger for quality, and the merger leads to a reduction of both
price and quality for the merged rm. Also in this case, the second-order e¤ects reinforce the
rst-order e¤ects. This case produces perhaps the most counterintuitive result, where a merger
leads to a price reduction. As shown in the previous section (cf. Proposition 2), this result is
captured in the Salop model for a set of parameter values where the demand responsiveness to
quality is su¢ciently high, which, in that framework, implies that rms compete su¢ciently
stronger on quality than on price.
For the remaining potential cases, where either the marginal variable quality costs are so
large that the strategic nature of the game is changed, or if the degree of competition is not
much stronger along one of the two dimensions (price and quality), the e¤ects of a merger on
the merged rms price and quality responses are genuinely ambiguous. Notice also that the
Salop model analysed in the previous section is only able to capture the second of the two
cases described in Proposition 4, where the merged rm reduces both price and quality. This
illustrates, rst, that the specic parameterisation of the Salop model has clear limitations,
and, second, that the two cases specied in Proposition 4 do not cover all relevant cases.
4.2.2 Quality and price responses of non-merging rms







































































Notice here that 	p > (<) 0 and 	q > (<) 0 if the rst-order e¤ects of the merger on the
merged rms price and quality are positive (negative).
It follows from (42)-(43) that the quality and price responses of non-merging rms depend
on two di¤erent factors: (i) the size of marginal variable quality costs, which determines




p), and (ii) the relative magnitude of cross-quality and cross-price e¤ects on demand,
which determines the direction of the rst-order e¤ects on the merged rms quality and price
(i.e., the signs of 	q and 	p).
Notice that whether the non-merging rms quality and price responses go in the same
direction or not depends only on the net strategic substitutability/complementarity of qualities
and prices. If qualities are net strategic substitutes (
q > 0) and prices are net strategic
complements (
p < 0), or vice versa (
q < 0 and 
p > 0), then quality and price responses
from the non-merging rms always go in the same direction. Otherwise, if qualities and prices
are both net strategic substitutes or net strategic complements, quality and price responses
go in opposite directions.
Once more, the direction of price and quality responses can be unambiguously pinned down
only for the case where marginal variable quality costs are su¢ciently low and where competi-
tion is much stronger along one of the two dimensions. The next proposition summarises the
price and quality responses of the non-merging rms:
Proposition 5 (i) If prices are net strategic complements and qualities are net strategic sub-
stitutes (i.e., 
p < 0 and 
q > 0), or vice versa (i.e., 
p > 0 and 
q < 0), then non-merging
rms quality and price responses always go in the same direction. Otherwise, the quality and
price responses of non-merging rms go in opposite directions. (ii) If marginal variable quality
costs are su¢ciently small, such that 
p < 0 and 
q > 0, non-merging rms will respond to
the merger by increasing both quality and price if the di¤erence between cross-quality e¤ects
and cross-price e¤ects is su¢ciently large in either direction.
Table 1 summarises the price and quality e¤ects of a merger for the case of su¢ciently
low marginal variable quality costs, which implies that qualities are net strategic substitutes
(
q > 0) and prices are net strategic complements (
p < 0). In this case there are three
di¤erent regimes, depending on the relative strength of competition along the two di¤erent
dimensions (price and quality).
Table 1: Price and quality responses to a merger when @c=@qi is small
Dimensions of competition Merged rm Non-merged rms
(1) Mainly price p " and q " p " and q "
(2) Both price and quality ?? (p "; q ") or (p #; q #)
(3) Mainly quality p # and q # p " and q "
The direction of price and quality responses are unambiguously determined for all rms in
Regimes 1 and 3, in which the degree of competition is su¢ciently strong on one dimension
relative to the other. The merged rm will increase both price and quality if the rms compete
mostly on price (Regime 1), and reduce both price and quality if competition is mainly on
quality (Regime 3). In both regimes, the non-merging rms respond by increasing both price
and quality. In the remaining Regime 2, in which competition is relatively strong along both
dimensions, the quality and price e¤ects of a merger is generally indeterminate, although we
know that the price and quality responses of the non-merged rms always go in the same
direction.
The above analysis suggests that there is a large number of possibilities regarding the
equilibrium quality and price responses by merging and non-merging rms. The Salop model
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analysed in Section 3 captures two of these possibilities: (i) if competition along the quality
dimension is su¢ciently strong, the merged rm reduces both quality and price, whereas the
non-merged rm increases both quality and price; (ii) if demand is less quality-responsive,
the merged rm reduces quality but increases the price, whereas the non-merged rm still
increases both quality and price. The former case, which corresponds to Regime 3 in Table
1, is characterised by 	p < 0. The latter case, which corresponds to Regime 2 in Table 1,
is characterised by 	p > 0. In both cases, 
q > 0, 
p < 0, 	q < 0 and (@Dk=@qi)	q +
(@Dk=@pi)	p > 0.
35 One interesting result from the Salop model is that, although the merged
rm always reduces quality, the average quality in the market goes up. This illustrates a more
general point. If qualities are net strategic substitutes, a reduction in the merged rms quality
provision does not necessarily imply that average quality provision in the market is reduced.
5 Implications for empirical studies
What are the implications of our results for empirical studies of merger e¤ects? A key lesson is
that the estimated merger e¤ects will be biased if the estimation does not account for quality
being endogenous. As our analysis has highlighted, a merger may indeed result in lower prices
and lower quality. Thus, empirical studies that focus only on price e¤ects may falsely conclude
that the merger is not anti-competitive, which may also induce the competition authority to
approve the merger despite substantial quality reductions.
This point is highlighted by the recent studies of Tenn et al. (2010) and Fan (2013) who
both show using structural models that failing to account for endogenous quality (or promo-
tion) leads to serious estimation bias in simulating the merger e¤ects. It is indeed common in
the empirical Industrial Organization literature to simulate the e¤ect of a merger along the
lines of the seminal paper by Nevo (2000). If the researcher has access to individual data on
consumption, then demand can be modelled through a multinomial conditional logit approach
where the choice of a product by each consumer is a function of price and quality attributes
o¤ered by all rms in the sample (or a mixed logit one to allow for unobserved consumer
preferences under some distributional assumptions). The model allows to recover the demand
responsiveness to quality and price and the cross-price and cross-quality e¤ects of the rivals.
Endogeneity of prices needs to be addressed for example through an instrumental variable
approach. Our model highlights that endogeneity of quality also needs to be addressed. The
same empirical literature allows to recover the marginal costs under Nash-Bertrand equilib-
rium assumption. If quality is not treated as exogenous, an analogous marginal cost can also
be recovered for quality, along the lines suggested by Tenn et al. (2010).36 A merger can
then be simulated and the demand responsiveness to quality and price of the rivals can be
computed under the assumption that the two merging rms choose quality and price as one
entity. A merger will raise stronger concerns if demand responsiveness to price and/or quality
drastically falls as a result of the simulated merger compared to the status quo.
35Recall that, in the Salop model, qualities are net strategic substitutes whereas prices are net strategic
complements.
36Most studies with a structural approach assume that the marginal cost is constant. As suggested by our
model, the marginal cost may be increasing in quality. A structural model which allows for marginal cost
increasing in quality and endogenous price and quality could be developed in future research.
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The above papers focus on ex-ante merger evaluations. Other studies instead focus on ex-
post merger evaluation, estimating the e¤ect of mergers on price that actually took place for
example within a reduced-form di¤erence-in-di¤erence econometric framework. Our analysis
highlights that a fuller evaluation requires the estimation of the mergers on both price and
quality. Moreover, it is critical to control for quality in the price equation and to control
for price in the quality equation. Since price and quality are endogenous, quality in the
price equation would have to be instrumented for example through an exogenous shifter in
the quality equation. Similarly, price in the quality equation could be instrumented with an
exogenous shifter in the price equation. An alternative approach is to not to include quality
in the price equation and quality in the price equation, to avoid endogeneity, but at least to
allow for correlation in the error terms of the price and the quality equation using a Seemingly
Unrelated Regression (SUR) approach.
Our analysis also highlights that the e¤ect of mergers depend on the extent to which
qualities and prices are strategic complements or substitutes in quality and prices, ie the
degree to which quality or price of a rm depends on the quality and price of the rival rms.
A natural approach to test for this is a spatial econometrics one, where the quality is regressed
against the rivals quality and price; and similarly, price is regressed against rivals quality and
price, as measured by the average quality or price in a given catchment area (say 40km)
weighted by the distance between the rm and each rival within the catchment area. Under
this type of specication, OLS is biased and inconsistent but can be estimated by maximum
likelihood, which is consistent and e¢cient in the presence of the spatial lag terms (Anselin,
1988; Mobley, 2003 for an example).
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have analysed the e¤ects of horizontal mergers when rms compete along two
di¤erent dimensions: price and quality. We have shown that the e¤ects of a merger are quite
involved because of the strategic relationship between quality and price, and we report some
perhaps surprising results. First, whether a merger induces the merger participants to increase
or reduce prices and qualities is far from clear-cut. If rms compete su¢ciently strongly on
quality, a merger might lead to lower prices, and if rms compete su¢ciently strongly on price,
a merger might lead to higher quality. In a Salop framework with three rms, the merging
rms always reduce quality, but possibly also price if demand responsiveness to quality is
su¢ciently high, i.e., if rms compete su¢ciently ercely on quality relative to price. Second,
the non-merging rms price and quality responses are also far from obvious. In the general
framework, we show that, if variable quality costs are su¢ciently small, a merger will induce
non-merging rms either to increase both price and quality, or to reduce both price and quality,
depending on the relative strength of price and quality competition. However, in the Salop
model, the non-merging rm always increases both quality and price as a response to the
merger.
The general pattern of our results suggest that welfare implications of mergers are much
less clear-cut when rms compete along two di¤erent dimensions, compared with the standard
case of price competition. As we have discussed above, there are two reasons for this. First,
a merger will most likely result in higher quality or lower price for some rms in the industry,
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which makes the welfare assessment of a merger a priori more ambiguous. Second, the presence
of xed quality costs implies that a merger might improve welfare through endogenous xed-
cost savings, something that we explicitly conrm in the Salop framework.
Our analysis has implications for empirical studies of merger e¤ects. The key lesson is
that the estimated merger e¤ects will be biased if the estimation does not account for quality
being endogenous. Empirical studies assessing the e¤ects of mergers either ex-ante or ex-post
need to take quality into account or they risk to underestimate the price increase arising from
a merger and to approve the merger despite substantial quality reductions.
Although we have conducted our analysis within a very general framework, we have never-
theless been forced to make a couple of simplications in order to make the analysis feasible.
We have assumed that demand is separable in all qualities and prices, and we have assumed
constant marginal production costs for given quality levels. Although these simplications
somewhat reduce the generality of the analysis, we still believe that we have been able to cap-
ture the most important mechanisms that determine the strategic choices in markets where
rms compete on both price and quality.
Besides the above mentioned simplications, our analysis also rests on some other key
assumptions which deserve some further discussion. First, we have assumed that a merger does
not a¤ect the choice of products o¤ered by the merging rms. By relaxing this assumption, we
could in principle allow the merged rm to relocate their products (in the spatial framework) or
to change the number of products o¤ered. Regarding the latter possibility, the most intuitive
e¤ect of a merger would be that the merged rm continues to produce only one of the two
products originally produced by the merger partners (or, alternatively, that the merged rm
closes down one of its plants, in the geographical interpretation of the model). This might be
a protable strategy if product-xed (or plant-xed) costs are su¢ciently large, which would
make the realisation of xed-cost savings an important motivation for a merger. In the Salop
framework with three rms, this would make also the post-merger game symmetric and would
be completely equivalent to a reduction in the number of (single-product) rms from three to
two. We know from the literature (Economides, 1993) that this would lead to higher prices and
higher quality (for all rms). A main mechanism behind this result is that demand for each
product would increase, which would result in higher equilibrium prices and, in turn, higher
quality (because of the within-rm strategic complementarity between price and quality).
Second, we have assumed that all costs of quality provision are product specic (or plant
specic). However, it might be that some types of quality investments (such as R&D, for
example) are costs that are incurred at rm level and where the benets of the investment
apply to all products (or plants) of the rm. Incorporating these types of rm-specic quality
investments would have at least two di¤erent e¤ects on our results. It would make merg-
ers more protable and it would also likely increase the scope for mergers to a¤ect quality
positively, since a merger would then be an instrument for rationalising the costs of quality
provision.
Finally, we have chosen to conduct our analysis within a horizontal di¤erentiation frame-
work where the pre-merger equilibrium is symmetric and rms provide the same level of
quality. On one hand, this approach is advantageous since the e¤ects of a merger do not
depend on the choice of merger participants. One the other hand, our model is probably not
able to capture all relevant e¤ects of mergers in markets where high-quality and low-quality
rms coexist. Future research could investigate if some of our main results extend to a vertical
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di¤erentiation framework with individuals di¤ering in the willingness to pay for quality, and
rms o¤ering products of di¤erent qualities.
Appendix A
This Appendix complements our merger analysis based on the Salop model, presented in
Section 3. Here we report the pre- and post-merger equilibrium values of prots, consumer
utility and welfare; the proofs of Propositions 1-3; and further details regarding endogenous
xed-cost savings caused by asymmetric market outcomes.
A.1. Equilibrium values of prots, consumer utility and welfare
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In the post-merger equilibrium, prots earned by the outsider and each of the merged
rms, respectively, are given by
o =
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Imposing the restriction t > 9 (b  c)2 =5k, it follows that
m > (<) 
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The average quality in the market in the post-merger equilibrium is
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Comparing (A12) and (11) yields
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parameter space dened by t < 3(3b 2c)(b c)
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is non-empty. Regarding the non-merging
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The average price in the market in the post-merger equilibrium is
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The numerator is monotonically increasing in t for all t > 9(b c)
2
4k
. Setting t at the lowest
level that still guarantees protable mergers, t = 9(b c)
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> 0. Thus, p > pi . (iii): Inserting the equilibrium values of qualities
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Q.E.D.
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The sign of (A19) is determined by the sign of the numerator, which is monotonically
increasing in t for t > 9(b c)
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i ) for all parameter congurations that yield protable merg-
ers. (ii): Consumers buying from the non-merging rm in the pre-merger equilibrium
(these consumers constitute one third of the market) can potentially benet from the
merger due to higher quality (if the quality increase outweighs the utility loss of higher
prices). The individual utility e¤ect of the merger for each of these consumers is
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If u > 0, the merger will also increase the utility of some consumers who switch from
the merged rms to the outside rm as a result of the merger, and who are located
su¢ciently close to the consumers who were indi¤erent between a merged and a non-
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i ) if b is su¢ciently large relative to t. Q.E.D.
A.3. Welfare properties of symmetric versus asymmetric market
outcomes
Our result in Proposition 3 that a merger can improve welfare because it results in a more
asymmetric market outcome, can be further explained and elaborated on by considering a
simplied two-rm version of our model. Consider a Hotelling model with two rms located
at each end of a unit line, where Firm 1 is located at 0 and Firm 2 is located at 1. All other
assumptions are identical to the Salop model in Section 3. Let x denote the location of the
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Maximising this function with respect to x, q1 and q2 yields the following rst-order conditions
@W
@q1
= bx  kq1   cx = 0; (A23)
@W
@q2
= b  c  kq2   bx+ cx = 0; (A24)
@W
@x
= t+ bq1   bq2   cq1 + cq2   2tx = 0: (A25)
This system of equations has a unique solution given by







It is straightforward to show that this outcome is also the Nash equilibrium outcome of a game
where the two rms choose quality and price simultaneously. Thus, simultaneous decision
making yields the rst-best outcome, as previously shown by Ma and Burgess (1993). This
result also holds for a Salop model with n > 2 rms, as conrmed by Economides (1993),
as long as the number of rms is exogenously given. However, this solution is the rst-best
outcome only for a subset of the parameter values for which the Nash equilibrium exists.
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tk   (b  c)2

< (>) 0 if kt > (<) (b  c)2 : (A27)
Thus, the determinant is negative (guaranteeing concavity) only if tk > (b  c)2. Otherwise,
the solution given by (A26) is a saddle point, and the rst-best solution is a corner solution
where all consumers buy from one rm and the other rm o¤ers zero quality. In this case,
if qualities are optimally chosen (from a welfare perspective) for a given value of x, any
asymmetric interior solution with positive qualities for both rms is welfare-superior to the
symmetric solution with x = 1
2
.
The intuition behind this result is the following. A more asymmetric outcome implies that
a given average quality level can be provided at lower costs, so the optimal average quality
level increases. This can be seen by solving (A23) and (A24) for q1 and q2, respectively, which




and q2 (x) =
(b  c) (1  x)
k
: (A28)
Optimal average quality, as a function of market shares, is then given by
xq1 (x) + (1  x) q1 (x) =
1
k
(b  c) (1  2x (1  x)) : (A29)
This expression is minimised at x = 1
2










, which illustrates that a more
asymmetric outcome reduces the xed cost of quality provision and therefore increases the
optimal average quality. On the other hand, total transportation costs are minimised in a
symmetric outcome with x = 1
2
. Thus, from a welfare perspective, there is a trade-o¤ be-
tween minimising the costs of quality provision (which are lower in asymmetric outcomes) and
minimising transportation costs (which are higher in asymmetric outcomes). An asymmet-
ric outcome is therefore welfare optimal if the marginal utility of quality is su¢ciently high
relative to the cost of travelling; in the Hotelling example, if tk < (b  c)2.
Appendix B
In this Appendix we present the details of the comparative statics results derived with the
general model in Section 4, and the proofs of Propositions 4 and 5.
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B.1. Strategic relationship between qualities and prices





















dqj = 0: (B1)
By applying Cramers Rule, the strategic relationship between qi and qj, when pi is optimally





















































































































































B.2. Comparative statics of the Nash equilibrium of the general
model
The Nash equilibrium is implicitly given by a system of four equations, given by (34)-(37),
which are here redened as






































where the demand functions are given by
Di (pi; pi; pk; :::; pk; qi; qi; qk; :::; qk)
Dj (pi; pi; pk; :::; pk; qi; qi; qk; :::; qk)
Dk (pi; pi; pk; :::; pk; qi; qi; qk; :::; qk) ; k 2 O:
By di¤erentiating (B6)-(B9) with respect to qi, pi, qk, pk and , we can write the system
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B.2.1. The e¤ect of a merger on the merged rms quality
















































































































































































































Notice that > 0 by the assumption of a negative denite Jacobian matrix. Since (pi   c(qi)) >
















































B.2.2. The e¤ect of a merger on the merged rms price






































































































or, when substituting from (B6),



















































































































B.2.3. The e¤ect of a merger on the non-merging rms qualities

































































































































which eliminates the third term in (B26). The remaining two terms can, after substituting










































































































B.2.4. The e¤ect of a merger on the non-merging rms prices



















































































































so the third term in (B32) vanishes. After substituting from (B11), the remaining two terms
can be written as




































































Proof of Proposition 4 (i) The sign of @qi=@ is determined by the sign of the sum of
the rst-order e¤ects (rst line in (38)) and the second-order e¤ects (second line in
(38)). The sign of the rst-order e¤ects is positive if j@Dj=@qij is su¢ciently small
relative to @Dj=@pi. If @c=@qi is su¢ciently low, the sign of the second-order e¤ects is
determined by the (inverse of the) sign of (@Di=@pk) 
p (@Di=@qk) 
q, with 
p < 0 and

q > 0. This di¤erence is negative, implying that the second-order e¤ects are positive,
if j@Di=@qkj is su¢ciently small relative to @Di=@pk . Thus, if marginal variable quality
costs are su¢ciently small, and if cross-quality e¤ects are su¢ciently small relative to
cross-price e¤ects, the rst-order and second-order e¤ects go in the same direction and
yields @qi=@ > 0. The sign of @pi=@ is determined in a similar way. (ii) The proof
of the second part of the Proposition follows exactly the same logic as the rst part.
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5 (i) The expressions in the square brackets of (42) and (43) are
identical. Thus, @qk=@ and @pk=@ have equal (opposite) signs if 
p and 
q have op-
posite (equal) signs. (ii) If marginal variable quality costs are su¢ciently small, such
that 
p < 0 and 
q > 0, then @qk=@ and @pk=@ have the same sign, which is deter-
mined by the sign of (@Dk=@qi)	q + (@Dk=@pi)	p, where 	q and 	p are the rst-order
e¤ects of the merged rms quality and price responses, respectively. If cross-quality
e¤ects are su¢ciently small relative to the cross-price e¤ects, then j(@Dk=@qi)	qj <
j(@Dk=@pi)	pj and 	p > 0, which implies that @qk=@ > 0 and @pk=@ > 0. On the
other hand, if cross-price e¤ects are su¢ciently small relative to the cross-quality e¤ects,
then j(@Dk=@qi)	qj > j(@Dk=@pi)	pj and 	q < 0, which again implies that @qk=@ > 0
and @pk=@ > 0. Q.E.D.
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